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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Torts-CONTRIBUTION AMONG JOINT TORTFEASORS-EFFEcr OF PARTIAL
RELEASE ON PRO RATA ALLOCATION OF LIABILITY
New York General Obligations Law § 15-108 (McKinney Supp. 1972)
Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288,
331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972)
At common law, the tort rule that a release given to one wrong-
doer operated to release the liability of all others was restricted in
application to true joint tortfeasors,1 i.e., those acting in concert. 2 Since
each tortfeasor by virtue of the relationship became jointly and
severally liable for the injury sustained,8 it was not unreasonable to
hold that a release extinguished an injured party's solitary cause of
action.4 Moreover, since the release was generally made by deed under
seal,5 questions of sufficient consideration were never raised.6
Later case law considerably broadened the application of the
original rule.7 Both concurrent and successive independent tortfeasors,
1 See Cocke v. Jennor, 80 Eng. Rep. 214 (K.B. 1614); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAw OF TORTS § 49, at 301 (4th ed. 1971); 63 CoLm. L. REv. 1142, 1143 (1963).
2 Strictly speaking, the words "joint tort" should be used only where the behavior
of two or more tort-feasors is such as to make it proper to treat the conduct of
each as the conduct of the others as well. In effect this requires the existence of
a concert of action or the breach of a joint duty.
I F. HARER & F. JAmEs, THE LAw OF TORTS § 10.1, at 692 (1956).
8 See Heydon's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 1150 (K.B. 1613); 1 F. HAPm & F. JAMES, supra
note 2, § 10.1, at 692.
4 The injury inflicted by joint tortfeasors gave rise to a single cause of action, al-
though the plaintiff could proceed against fewer than all of those involved. Since each in-
dividual was charged with the total wrongdoing, it is apparent that a discharge of one
properly effected a discharge of all persons liable. See Brinsmead v. Harrison, L.R. 7 C.P.
547 (1872); Cocke v. Jennor, 80 Eng. Rep. 214 (K.B. 1614).
5 See Bronson v. Fitzhugh, 1 Hill 185 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841); Havighurst, The Effect of
a Settlement with One Co-Obligor upon the Obligations of the Others, 45 CoRNELl. L.Q.
1, 3 (1950).
6 See W. PROssER, supra note 1, § 49, at 801; 1 S. Wn.usrON, CoNmTcrs § 205 (3d ed.
1957).
7 Professors Harper and James maintain that the extension of the term joint tort-
feasor to include other than conspirators is attributable to confused thinking in the courts.
Originally, procedural joinder and joint and several liability were interchangeable con-
cepts. In fact, only those tortfeasors who were jointly and severally liable under the sub-
stantive law could be joined as defendants. When early codes sought to introduce reform
to achieve procedural convenience, the concept of procedural joinder became detached
from substantive liability. As a result, joinder was allowed not only where there had been
action in concert, but also where the independent concurring wrongs of several tortfeasors
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as well as true joint tortfeasors, were permitted to raise release as a
defense." Although this resulted in a theoretical contradictionO since
one rationale of the rule was that only a single cause of action existed,10
most courts refused to recognize any inconsistency." Instead, they acted
to bolster the effectiveness of the release by creating a presumption that
the injured party had received complete satisfaction for his injury
had caused a single indivisible injury and damage could not be apportioned. However,
since the parties were joined as joint tortfeasors, their liability was regarded as being joint
and several. The procedural tail thus wagged the substantive dog. See 1 F. H.PERt & F.
JAMEs, supra note 2. § 10.1, at 695-97.
8 See Parchefsky v. Kroll Bros., 267 N.Y. 410, 196 N.E. 308 (1935); Milks v. Mclver,
264 N.Y. 267, 190 N.E. 487 (1934); Bronson v. Fitzhugh, 1 Hill 185 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841).
The rationale for this application of the rule is best stated by the court in Milks v. Mclver,
supra:
It may be argued that the original wrongdoer who caused the injury and the
physician whose negligence aggravated the injury are not, in technical sense,
joint tortfeasors. Nevertheless their wrongs coalesced and resulted in damage
which would not have been sustained but for the original injury.
264 N.Y. at 269, 190 N.E. at 488. As a result, parties were permitted to raise the defense
of release where the relationship was that of master-servant. See Kinsey v. William Spencer
& Son Corp., 165 Misc. 143, 300 N.Y.S. 391 (Sup. Ct. 1937), aff'd mem., 255 App. Div. 995,
8 N.Y.S.2d 529 (2d Dep't 1938), aff'd mem., 281 N.Y. 601, 22 NXE.2d 168 (1939); Gavin v.
Malherbe, 146 Misc. 51, 261 N.Y.S. 373 (Sup. Ct. 1932), aff'd mem., 240 App. Div. 779, 266
N.Y.S. 897 (2d Dep't 1933), aff'd mem., 264 N.Y. 403, 191 N.E. 486 (1934). The defense was
also available in driver-owner situations. Cf. Sarine v. American Lumbermen's Mut. Cas.
Co., 258 App. Div. 653, 17 N.Y.S.2d 754 (2d Dep't 1940).
For more extensive discussion of the effect of release on the liability of a tortfeasor,
see generally Havighurst, supra note 5; 63 COLur. L. REv. 1142 (1963); 31 FoaRnHsA L.
REv. 836 (1963); 14 SYRAcusE L. REv. 526 (1963); 31 U. CN. L. Rxy. 489 (1962); Annot., 73
A.L.R.2d 403 (1960).
9 See Derby v. Prewitt, 12 N.Y.2d 100, 187 N.E.2d 556, 236 N.Y.S.2d 953 (1962). The
essential difficulty is that where the tortfeasors have acted independently and successively,
as where a physician aggravates the original injury inflicted, the plaintiff clearly has two
distinct causes of action. Since he can proceed against the original wrongdoer and collect
for the harm he caused and still proceed against the physician for the additional damage,
it is simply inconsistent to reason that a release given to the original wrongdoer releases
the physician as well on the grounds that there is but one cause of action. What perhaps
generated such confused thinking is the ability of the injured party to hold the original
wrongdoer liable for all the damages which result. See Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16,
152 N.E.2d 249, 176 N.YS.2d 996 (1958); Parchefsky v. Kroll Bros., 267 N.Y. 410, 196 N.E.
308 (1935).
10 See, e.g., Luco v. Curran, 2 N.Y.2d 157, 139 N.E.2d 133, 157 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1956);
Walsh v. New York Cent. & H.R.R.R., 204 N.Y. 58, 97 N.E. 408 (1912); ef. Duck v. Mayeu,
[1892] 2 Q.B. 511.
Other reasons advanced in support of the rule include (1) that the instrument should
be strictly construed against the releasing party, (2) that the claimant should be limited to
one recovery, and (3) that a partial release creates problems in the law of contribution.
See Havighurst, supra note 5, at 3-7.
11 See W. PRossER, supra note 1, § 49, at 301; Annot., supra note 8. This position,
however, has been the subject of considerable criticism, both in the courts and in the com-
mentaries. See. e.g., McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Breen v. Peck, 28
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even where the release was not under seal. 12 Ostensibly, this ensured
that only one satisfaction could be had for the damage incurred.13
Plaintiffs' attempts to mitigate the severity and rigidity of this rule
resulted in the creation of a host of judicial exceptions. Among the
primary artifices employed were the covenant not to sue 4 and the re-
lease with express reservation. 15 These devices effectively permitted an
injured party to accomplish indirectly that which was prohibited
N.J. 351, 146 A.2d 665 (1958); 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMEs, supra note 2, § 10.1, at 711-14; 2 S.
WMLSrON, supra note 6, § 338A, at 722-25; Havighurst, supra note 5, at 4-5; 17 ILL. L.
REV. 563 (1924); 91 U. CIN. L. REv. 489, 493 (1962).
12 See, e.g., Rector of St. James Church v. City of New York, 261 App. Div. 614, 26
N.Y.S.2d 762 (2d Dep't 1941); Shaw v. Crissey, 182 Misc. 27, 43 N.Y.S.2d 237 (Sup. Ct.
1943); 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1142, 1144 (1963).
13 See, e.g., Milks v. McIver, 264 N.Y. 267, 190 N.E. 487 (1934); Walsh v. New York
Cent. & H.R.R.R., 204 N.Y. 58, 97 N.E. 408 (1912); Barrett v. Third Ave. R.R., 45 N.Y. 628
(1871). It is again suggested that this result is attributable to confused thinking. Whereas
a release is the abandonment of a claim against a party, a satisfaction is the full com-
pensation accepted for injuries received. Since a release can be partial and/or gratuitously
given, it is clear that although all satisfactions create a release, all releases do not indicate
full satisfaction. See 1 F. HARPER 8= F. JAMEs, supra note 2, § 10.1, at 711.
One consequence of the presumption that a release indicates a full satisfaction of a
claim has been the holding that the effect of a release cannot be avoided because of lack
of knowledge of the existence of a cause of action. See Ludo v. Curran, 2 N.Y.2d 157,
189 N.E.2d 133, 157 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1956); Kirchner v. New Home Sewing Mach. Co., 135
N.Y. 182, 31 N.E. 1104 (1892); Leonard v. Gottlieb, 278 App. Div. 786, 104 N.Y.S.2d 75
(2d Dep't 1951). This is true, of course, only in the absence of fraud. McNamara v. East-
man Kodak Co., 232 N.Y. 18, 133 N.E. 113 (1921); Kirchner v. New Home Sewing Mach.
Co., supra.
14 The covenant not to sue, unlike a release, does not extinguish the cause of action;
rather, it is an enforceable promise by the maker not to sue on his claim against the
covenantee. Although not technically a defense against later suit, it has been so regarded in
order to prevent circuity of action. See 4 A. CoRmN, CoNrRAcrs § 932, at 744 (1951); 2
S. WI.LISrON, supra note 6, § 338, at 710-11. The device and the reasoning involved have
been severely criticized for their artificiality. See McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659 (D.C.
Cir. 1948); Havighurst, supra note 5, at 7-9.
15 The release with reservation theoretically allows the plaintiff to split his cause of
action. Thus, this exception is prohibited in jurisdictions which firmly adhere to the doc-
trine that the plaintiff possesses a single cause of action against all tortfeasors. See, e.g.,
Muse v. Devito, 243 Mass. 884, 137 N.E. 730 (1928). New York courts, however, simply
regard such a release as the equivalent of a covenant not to sue. See, e.g., Plath v.
Justus, 28 N.Y.2d 16, 268 N.E.2d 117, 319 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1971); Gilbert v. Finch, 173 N.Y.
455, 66 N.E. 133 (1908). Other situations in which the courts have refused to regard a
release as affecting the liability of others include: (1) when the release was given to a
party not in fact liable for the injury (see, e.g., Littell v. Cranford Co., 203 N.Y.S.2d 975
(Sup. Ct. 1960)); (2) when the release was intended only as a partial satisfaction (see, e.g.,
Gaylor v. Burroughs, 248 App. Div. 915, 290 N.Y.S. 679 (2d Dep't 1936), aff'd mem., 273
N.Y. 606, 7 N.E.2d 716 (1987)); (3) when there was no claim in existence to be released at
the time the release was given (see, e.g., Wilder v. Pennsylvania R.R., 245 N.Y. 36, 156
N.E. 88 (1927)); and (4) when the successive tortfeasor caused a new and separate injury.
See, e.g., Milks v. McIver, 264 N.Y. 267, 190 N.E. 487 (1984).
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directly. Yet, despite these exceptions, numerous laymen inadvertently
continued to sign away their rights.'0
In the event plaintiff or his counsel was shrewd enough to take
advantage of an available exception, full satisfaction of the claim
necessarily resulted in inequitable distribution of liability among the
remaining tortfeasors. 17 Especially where the release was gratuitous or
for nominal consideration, the public policies of risk distribution and
fundamental fairness were greatly impeded.'8 Since the released party
could not be impleaded under third-party practice,10 no right to contri-
bution existed for the nonsettling tortfeasor. 0 The latter would have
to assume the full burden of liability, regardless of the measure of his
fault.21
16 The release rule has been greatly criticized as being a trap for the unwary. See
Derby v. Prewitt, 12 N.Y.2d 100, 104, 187 N.E.2d 556, 558, 236 N.Y.S.2d 953, 957 (1962).
It is apparent from the cases that this includes unwary counsel as well. See, e.g., Lucio v.
Curran, 2 N.Y.2d 157, 139 N.E.2d 133, 157 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1956).
17 Unless the release discharges the full pro rata share of the liability attributable to
the releasee, the releasor in effect causes the nonsettling tortfeasors to bear this burden.
See Annot., 20 A.L.R.2d 1044 (1951). An attempt to prevent this result is evidenced by the
provision in the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act stating that a release given
by the plaintiff reduces his claim against remaining tortfeasors by the consideration paid or
the releasee's pro rata share of the liability, whichever is greater. UNIFORM CoNTR TiON
AMONG ToRmTEAsoR Acr § 4 (1939 version). This, however, was changed in the revised act
in order to promote settlements. UmrorM CONTRIBUTION AMONG ToaRTFEAsoRs Acr § 4
(1955 version); cf. notes 38-40 and accompanying text infra.
18 The importance of these policies was markedly demonstrated in Dole v. Dow Chem.
Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 31 N.YS.2d 382 (1972). In an effort to terminate ob-
jectionable practices contrary to these policies, the New York Court of Appeals substantially
rewrote the law of contribution among tortfeasors. See notes 45-59 and accompanying text
infra.
19 See Putvin v. Buffalo Elec. Co., 5 N.Y.2d 447, 458, 158 N.E.2d 691, 694, 186 N.Y.S2d
15, 20 (1959); Fox v. Western N.Y. Motor Lines, Inc., 257 N.Y. 305, 307-08, 178 N.E. 289,
289-90 (1931). Impleader is proper only when the third party is viewed as liable or pos-
sibly liable to the defendant. See N.Y. Crv. PRac. LiAw § 1007 (McKinney 1963). The
right to contribution, however, arose only after a judgment was obtained. See note 20 infra.
20 In order to come within the ambit of N.Y. Cxv. PRAc. LAw § 1401 (McKinney Supp.
1972), which governs the right to contribution, it is necessary that (1) a joint money judg-
ment be recovered against two or more defendants by plaintiff, and (2) plaintiff's judgment
actually be satisfied, one defendant paying more than his pro rata share. See 2A J. WEIN-
SrmN, H. KoRN & A. ML.ER, NMV YORK CIvIL PRACrxcE 1401.01 (1972). Interpreting this
section, courts uniformly have been strict constructionists. See, e.g., Baidach v. Togut, 7
N.Y.2d 128, 164 N.E.2d 373, 196 N.Y.S.2d 67 (1959) (predecessor section); Ward v. Iroquois
Gas Corp., 258 N.Y. 124, 179 N.E. 317 (1932) (predecessor section).
21 The sole exception to the prohibition against use of third party practice to effect
a shifting of liability among tortfeasors was where a passively negligent party sought re-
covery from an actively negligent tortfeasor. Since the action was for indemnification, third
party practice was permitted. See Bush Terminal Bldgs. Co. v. Luckenback S.. Co., 9
N.Y.2d 426, 174 NXE.2d 516, 214 N.Y.S.2d 428 (1961); Putvin v. Buffalo Elec. Co., 5 N.Y.2d
447, 158 N.E.2d 691, 186 N.Y.S2d 15 (1959); McFall v. Compagnie Maritime Belge (Lloyd
Royal) S.A., 304 N.Y. 314, 107 NXE.2d 463 (1952).
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In 1928, New York sought to alleviate the severity of the common
law rules of release by the almost total adoption 2 of the Model Joint
Obligations Act.23 Both tort and contract claims were subject to the
provision that a general release would not result in the complete dis-
charge of other obligors,24 since the statute defined "obligation" to
include both tort and contract liability.25 Instead, the obligee's claim
was reduced by the pro rata share for which the releasee would other-
wise have been liable.26 This protection afforded the tortfeasor, how-
ever, applied only where the plaintiff made no express reservation of
rights. Where reservation was express, co-obligors were credited only
with that consideration actually given for the release.
27
Despite the seemingly unambiguous language of the statute,
28
several lower New York courts viewed the provisions as having only
restricted application in situations in which the obligation was in tort,
regarding the common law rule as avoided only where the tort damages
had been liquidated prior to release.29 Otherwise, it was reasoned, no
precise pro rata reduction of the claim could be calculated. The New
York Court of Appeals adopted this construction of the statutory lan-
guage just prior to its amendment in 1972, thereby settling a conflict
among the lower courts that had existed for many years 30
22 Debtor & Creditor Law §§ 231-40, ch. 833, §§ 231-40, [1928] N.Y. Laws 1764 (repealed
1964). The same material is now substantially covered by N.Y. GEN. OBLiG. LAW §§ 15-101
to -110 (McKinney 1964 & Supp. 1972).
23 MODEL JOINT OBLIGATIONS Acr (1925).
24 Debtor & Creditor Law § 235, ch. 833, § 235, [1928] N.Y. Laws 1765 (repealed 1964).
25 The Debtor & Creditor Law provided:
In this article, unless otherwise expressly stated, "obligation" includes a
liability in tort; "obligor" includes a person liable for a tort; "obligee" includes
a person having a right based on a tort. "Several obligors" means obligors
severally bound for the same performance.
Id. § 231, ch. 833, § 231, [1928] N.Y. Laws 1765. The same wording was carried over into
N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 15-101 (McKinney 1964), as amended, id. § 15-101 (McKinney
Supp. 1972).
26 Debtor & Creditor Law § 235, ch. 833, § 235, [1928] N.Y. Laws 1765 (repealed
1964).
27 See id. §§ 233-35, ch. 833, §§ 233-35, [1928] N.Y. Laws 1765; N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LMW
§§ 15-103 to -105, (McKinney 1964).
28 See note 25 supra. See also Sarine v. American Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 258
App. Div. 653, 17 N.Y.S.2d 754 (2d Dep't 1940).
29 See, e.g., Rector of St. James Church v. City of New York, 261 App. Div. 614, 26
N.Y.S.2d 762 (2d Dep't 1941); Bossong v. Muhleman, 254 App. Div. 738, 3 N.Y.S.2d 992
(2d Dep't 1938). But see Berlow v. New York State Thruway Auth., 35 App. Div. 2d 336,
316 N.Y.S.2d 238 (3d Dep't 1970), rev'd mem., 29 N.Y.2d 949, 280 N.E.2d 366, 329 N.Y.S.2d
579 (1972), which specifically rejected the contention that damages had to be liquidated
before the sections applied to a tort situation. Accord, Lurie v. Goldman, 53 Misc. 2d
250, 278 N.Y.S.2d 549 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
30 See Malvica v. Blumenfeld, 28 N.Y.2d 851, 271 N.E.2d 227, 322 N.Y.S.2d 249 (1971).
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The most recent attempt to eliminate confusion and interject fair-
ness into the law of release is found in amended section 15-101 and new
section 15-108 of the New York General Obligations Law.3 1 As
amended, section 15-101 omits references to tort claims and claimants
in its definition of obligor.s2 Restricting the scope of section 15-105 to
releases given to contract obligors only, the amendment thus eliminates
the need to inquire whether damages were liquidated at the time of
release.
More important, however, is the effect of section 15-108,13 added
specifically to deal with the effect of a discharge of liability given to a
joint tortfeasor. Expressly applicable to both releases and covenants
not to sue, the section provides that such writings affect only the
liability of the party to whom the instrument is given.34 Other tort-
feasors can avail themselves of its effect only where express provision
is so made.35 The burden of proof on the issue of the release's effect is
thus shifted from plaintiff to defendant.
Section 15-108 also affects the extent to which nonsettling tortfea-
sors are liable to the plaintiff. Apparently relying on a "compensation"
test,36 the section provides that the plaintiff's claim against those re-
maining liable is reduced only "to the extent of any amount stipulated
31 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW §§ 15-101, -108 (McKinney Supp. 1972); see N.Y. Leg. Doc.
No. 65K (1972).
32 N.Y. GEN. OBLiG. LAW § 15-101 (McKinney Supp. 1972), amending id. § 15-101
(McKinney 1964).
33 Id. § 15-108 (McKinney Supp. 1972), added by ch. 830, § 3, [1972] N.Y. Laws 2532.
34 When a release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce a judgment is
given to one of two or more persons liable or claimed to be liable in tort
for the same injury, or the same wrongful death, it does not discharge any
of the other tortfeasors from liability for the injury or wrongful death unless its
terms expressly so provide, but it reduces the claim of the releasor against
the other tortfeasors to the extent of any amount stipulated by the release
or the covenant, or in the amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever
is the greater.
N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. L w § 15-108 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
35 Id.
36 Absent application of the common law bar, courts generally employ one of two
tests to determine whether in fact a release has resulted in full satisfaction of the
releasor's claim. The "compensation" test compares the amount of consideration received
with the estimated or liquidated damages actually incurred by the releasor. See Berlow
v. New York State Thruway Auth., 35 App. Div. 2d 356, 316 N.Y.S.2d 238 (3d Dep't 1970),
rev'd mem., 29 N.Y.2d 949, 280 N.E2d 866, 329 N.Y.S.2d 579 (1972). The "intent" test
merely asks whether the parties intended the consideration to be in full satisfaction of
the claim. See Gilbert v. Finch, 173 N.Y. 455, 66 N.E. 133 (1903). The decision of the
court in Derby v. Prewitt, 12 N.Y.2d 100, 187 N.E.2d 556, 236 N.Y.S.2d 953 (1962),
specifically indicated that either test was a satisfactory means of determining whether
full compensation had been made. The sole concern of the court in such a case was
to see that the plaintiff, although compensated, did not obtain what amounted to a
double recovery.
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in the release or the covenant, or in the amount of the consideration
paid for it, whichever is greater."' 7 Although this elimination of the
pro rata rule encourages gratuitous releases, 38 it still prevents the plain-
tiff from achieving a double recovery for his injury. 9 In addition, such
a device increases the attractiveness of early settlement, though at the
expense of the tortfeasor who wishes to challenge the asserted claim or
otherwise invoke his judicial rights.40
This ability to discharge certain tortfeasors for less than their
proportional amount of liability may generate more difficulties than
are resolved. Previously, contribution rights among joint tortfeasors
never posed serious problems. Under the earlier statute, when no express
reservation was made, the release operated to reduce the plaintiff's claim
by the tortfeasor's pro rata share of liability. No need for contribution
therefore arose. 41 When a plaintiff expressly reserved his rights against
the nonsettling tortfeasors, however, the release operated to reduce the
87 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 15-108 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
88 The 1939 version of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act was spe-
cifically changed in 1955 so that a release reduced the plaintiff's claim only by the
amount of consideration given or the amount stated, instead of by the pro rata share
of the releasee's liability. As is stated in the Commissioners' Note to § 4 of the revised
version, the effect of the pro rata rule
[h]as been to discourage settlements in joint tort cases, by making it impossible
for one tortfeasor alone to take a release and dose the file. Plaintiff's attorneys
are said to refuse to accept any release which contains the provision reducing
the damages "to the extent of the pro rata share of the released tortfeasor,"
because they have no way of knowing what they are giving up. The "pro rata
share" cannot be determined in advance of judgment against the other tort-
feasors. In many cases their chief reason for settling with one rather than
another is that they hope to get more from the party with whom they do
not settle.
UNIFORM CONTmMON AMONG ToRTFEAsons Acr § 4, Commissioners' Note (1955 version).
Thus, the pro rata rule was discarded despite the potential for collusion and unfairness
to remaining tortfeasors present in the revised version. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. IAW § 15-108
(McKinney Supp. 1972) is substantially based on revised Uniform Act § 4. See note 84 supra.
89 Double recovery was also prevented under prior law in similar circumstances. See,
e.g., Livant v. Livant, 18 App. Div. 2d 883, 289 N.Y.S.2d 608 (1st Dep't), appeal dismissed,
18 N.Y.2d 894, 198 N.E.2d 503, 243 N.Y.S.2d 676 (1963). What is different, however, is
that in situations in which the damages are unliquidated at the time of release, the pos-
sibility of obtaining a full monetary recovery from all persons liable is now real, rather
than theoretical. See note 68 and accompanying text infra.
40 As in the case of a gratuitous release, or one for nominal consideration, the
nonsettling tortfeasor is burdened with damages disproportionate to the degree or extent
of his fault. The relief afforded by the contribution law is obviated by the effect of
the release. See notes 18-21 and accompanying text supra.
41 Such was the case under former General Obligations Law § 15-105 (N.Y. GN.
OBLIG. LAw § 15-105 (McKinney 1964), as amended, id. § 15-105 (McKinney Supp. 1972))
and former Debtor & Creditor Law § 235, ch. 838, § 235, [1928] N.Y. Laws 1765 (repealed
1964). Since the pro rata share has already been deducted, there is no possible excess
payment that can be made by the nonsettling party.
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claim only by the consideration given. In such instances, contribution
rights were easily circumvented by the injured party's failure to join
the released party as a defendant in the action.42 Impleader in such
circumstances was unavailable to the defendant, and no pro rata alloca-
tion of liability was possible.43 Thus, despite the relative fault of the
parties, a plaintiff could require one defendant to bear the full brunt
of liability and risk distribution."
In its recent decision in Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.,45 the New York
Court of Appeals undertook to reform the law of contribution and re-
move the potential for abuse. In Dole, an employee of a milling com-
pany had succumbed to chemical fumes present in a recently fumigated
storage bin. A wrongful death action was brought by the worker's ad-
ministratrix seeking recovery solely from Dow, the manufacturer of the
fumigant.40 The defendant denied responsibility, and instead asserted
that decedent's employer, George Urban Milling Company, was the
negligent party. Thus, in a third-party complaint, Dow sought indemni-
fication for any judgment that might be rendered against it on the basis
that its negligence, if any, was merely secondary and passive in nature
in comparison to that of the employer.47 The Supreme Court, Special
Term, denied Urban's motion to dismiss the third-party complaint but
was unanimously reversed by the Appellate Division, 48 which held that
42 See Bailey v. Kew Queens Corp., 78 N.Y.S.2d 509 (Sup. Ct. 1947), appeal dismissed,
92 N.Y.S.2d 312 (Ist Dep't 1949).
43 See notes 19-21 and accompanying text supra.
44 There is little apparent reason for allowing the plaintiff so decisively to control
a remedy which clearly is intended for the benefit of defendants. Once the plaintiff has
received full compensation, his interest in the litigation should logically be terminated. See
Gregory, Tort Contribution Practice in New York, 20 CoPur mL L.Q. 269 (1935).
45 80 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972), rev'g 35 App. Div. 2d 149,
316 N.Y.S.2d 348 (4th Dep't 1970).
46 Plaintiff's decision to proceed solely against Dow Chemical was dictated by
necessity. Under New York's Workmen's Compensation Law, the administratrix was
precluded from seeking recovery from the deceased's employer. See N.Y. WoRKmEN's CoMP.
LAw § 11 (McKinney 1965).
47 This contention that the employer functioned as an active tortfeasor provided
the only legal avenue for escaping full liability. See notes 20-21 and accompanying text
supra. Precisely what constitutes active and passive negligence remains unclear. In McFall
v. Compagnie Maritime BeIge (Lloyd Royal) SAL, 304 N.Y. 314, 107 NE.2d 463 (1952).
it was held that passive negligence exists at least when the defendant is negligent
merely in maintaining a dangerous condition without knowledge of its presence. Of
importance is the "factual disparity" between the delinquency of the tortfeasors involved.
Later cases have done little to improve upon this definition. See, e.g., Jackson v. Associated
Dry Goods Corp., 13 N.Y.2d 112, 116, 192 N.E.2d 167, 169, 242 N.Y.S.2d 210, 214 (1963):
"Active negligence . . . is not determined by whether the conduct of the party seeking
indemnification is affirmative or permissive, for acts of omission as well as acts of com-
mission may constitute active negligence ...."
48 Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 35 App. Div. 2d 149, 316 N.Y.S.2d 348 (4th Dep't 1970).
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Dow's own active negligence prohibited such indemnification.49 Re-
versing this decision, the Court of Appeals determined that impleader
is proper whenever a third party is responsible for part of the negli-
gence for which a defendant is cast in damages.50 Following an ap-
portionment of liability based on fault,'1 the defendant can recover
from the impleaded party the amount of damages attributable to that
party's actions.
52
As established in Dole, the right of contribution remains personal
to the defendant and cannot be affected or waived by design of the
plaintiff .2 Conversely, the right cannot function to increase or diminish
plaintiff's recovery. 4 Indirectly, however, the Dole right of contri-
bution has the potential to reduce significantly the benefits accruing
to plaintiffs under General Obligations Law section 15-108. Although
the statute permits a plaintiff to release a joint tortfeasor for less than
his full apportioned liability55 it is clear under Dole that the remaining
defendants' right to apportioned liability still remainsY6 Since this right
will ultimately permit the nonsettling tortfeasor to extract a full pro
rata share from the released tortfeasor, the latter obtains no financial
49 Id. at 151-52, 316 N.YS.2d at 351.
50 The conclusion reached is that where a third party is found to have been
responsible for a part, but not all, of the negligence for which a defendant is
cast in damages, the responsibility for that part is recoverable by the prime
defendant against the third party. To reach that end there must necessarily be
an apportionment of responsibility in negligence between those parties.
30 N.Y.2d at 148-49, 282 N.E.2d at 292, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 387.
51 This apportionment of liability is expressly stated to be a question of fact for
the jury. Id. at 149, 282 N.E.2d at 292, 331 N.Y.S2d at 387.
52 The court stated that when there is an apportionment of liability made on the
basis of relative fault, further contribution pursuant to N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 1401
(McKinney Supp. 1972) is expressly prohibited. 30 N.Y.2d at 153, 282 N.E.2d at 295, 331
N.Y.S.2d at 391. This statement appears to render § 1401 a dead letter, since the right
to contribution accrues only after a judgment has already been satisfied by a joint
tortfeasor. See note 20 supra. Except where fault is dearly seen to be evenly at-
tributable to all parties, there will always be recourse to the right of relative fault
allocation, which accrues at the time the cause of action arises.
53 This rule is clear from the court's statement that the apportionment of responsi-
bility can either be made in a separate action or as a separate and distinct issue in the
prime action, with the defendant able to implead the third party under N.Y. Civ. PRAC.
LAw § 1007 (McKinney 1963). 30 N.Y.2d at 149, 282 N.E.2d at 292, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 387.
54 See Kelly v. Long Island Lighting Co., 31 N.Y.2d 25, 30, 286 N.E.2d 241, 243, 334
N.Y.S.2d 851, 855 (1972):
It should, of course, be understood that this refinement of the rule of con-
tribution does not apply to or change the plaintiff's right to recover against
any joint tort-feasor in a separate or common action the total amount of his
damage suffered and not compensated.
55 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 15-108 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
56 See note 53 supra.
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advantage through settlement. On the contrary, besides running the
risk of overpayment, 57 the releasee incurs the additional expense of
trial. Accordingly, all inducement to settle vanishes.
Any just resolution of the problem raised by this conflict between
Dole and the statute must entail an evaluation of the competing public
policies involved. The Dole rule of relative responsibility among tort-
feasors is predicated on the principle of fairness and the social advan-
tage gained through proper liability distribution.58 This policy was
largely a response to the inequitable practice by some plaintiffs of pur-
suing certain tortfeasors while ignoring others, thereby placing the
entire burden on the former group.59 If a plaintiff is still able to ac-
complish this result by the artifice of release, the Dole holding will be
critically undermined. Section 15-108, however, is predicated upon the
long-standing public policy 0 favoring the settlement of claims and
avoidance of the burdens of litigation.61 Although Dole does not affect
the plaintiff's incentive to compromise, it does destroy the defendant's
motivation. 2 In addition to the monetary hardships such a conse-
57 Two distinct situations can arise in which a settling tortfeasor will be subjected
to overpayment. The amount given for the release may be (1) greater than the total
amount of damages assessed by the jury, or (2) less than the total amount of damages
but more than that fraction allocable to the releasee. If situation (1) occurs, the remaining
tortfeasors pay nothing to plaintiff. Moreover, the releasee has no basis for compelling
the others to share the loss, since his payment was voluntarily made. See Yawger v.
American Sur. Co., 212 N.Y. 292, 106 N.E. 64 (1914). For the same reasons, if situation
(2) occurs, the nonsettling tortfeasors need only pay the difference, with the releasee
once again having no recourse through contribution. See generally Note, Consequences
of Proceeding Separately Against Concurrent Tortfeasors, 68 HARv. L. REv. 697 (1955);
55 MIcH. L. REv. 1200 (1957).
58 " 'The present system runs counter to tort policy goals of deterrence, equitable
loss sharing by all the wrongdoers, effective loss distribution over a large segment of
society, and rapid compensation ....' 30 N.Y.2d at 150, 282 N.E.2d at 293, 331 N.Y.S.2d
at 389, quoting Comment, Contribution and Indemnity in California, 57 CALF. L. Rv.
490, 516 (1969).
59 The court recognized that some of the rigors of the contribution law under
N.Y. Civ. PFAc. LAw § 1401 (McKinney Supp. 1972) had been mitigated through imple-
mentation of the active-passive negligence concept. Cf. note 21 supra. However, since this
formulation merely shifted the liability in toto from one tortfeasor to another and in
addition was vaguely defined, the court regarded it as a most inadequate and inequitable
solution to the problem posed. 30 N.Y.2d at 148-49, 282 N.Y.2d at 292, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 387.
60 See Post v. Thomas, 212 N.Y. 264, 106 N.E. 69 (1914); Weil v. Wel, 227 App.
Div. 378, 237 N.Y.S. 668 (Ist Dep't 1929); Levey v. Babb, 39 Misc. 2d 648, 241 N.Y.S.2d
642 (Sup. Ct. 1963); Havighurst, supra note 5, at 20-22. See generally 55 Msfci. L. REv.
1200 (1957); 12 RUTGERs L. REV. 533 (1958).
61 See note 38 supra.
62 See note 57 and accompanying text supra.
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quence imposes on injured parties, 3 a decrease in settlements exacer-
bates the problem of already overcrowded court dockets.64
Although the conflict posed lends itself to several judicial solu-
tions,65 the only acceptable alternative is that which harmonizes, as
far as practicable, the competing policies involved.66 Accordingly, a
63 As is pointed out by proponents of no-fault insurance, one of the main deficiencies
of the present system is that the injured party may not be able to survive financially
until his rights are enforced by litigation. See, e.g., A. CONARD, J. MORGAN, R. PRATF, C.
VOLTZ & R. BOMBAUGH, AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COST AND PAYMENTS 221 (1964); INSURANCE
DEP'T, STATE OF NEW YORK, AuroMoBILE INSURANCE . . . FOR WHOSE BENEFIT? 68 (1970).
04 See, e.g., INSTITUTE OF JuDICAr. ADMINISTRATION, CALENDAR STATUS STUDY-1972: STATE
TRIAL COURTS OF GENERAL JURSDICTON-PERsoNAL INJURY JURY CASES 9-11 (1972); Rosen-
berg, Court Congestion: Status, Causes, and Proposed Remedies, in THE COURTS, THE
PUBLIC AND THE LAw EXPLOSION 29, 30-54 (American Assembly ed. 1965).
65 The situation as it now stands in New York is unworkable and impractical. The
New Jersey Supreme Court, when confronted with a strikingly similar quandary, felt that
there were two viable alternatives. The first, set out in Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust
Co., 17 NJ. 67, 110 A.2d 24 (1954), was to reduce the releasor's claim by the pro rata
share of the releasee's liability or the amount of consideration given, whichever is
greater. This solution avoided subjecting the settling tortfeasor to demands for con-
tribution, a result which the court foresaw "would have a stiffing effect upon efforts at
compromise and settlement, contrary to the policy of our law which strongly favors
disposition of disputes by compromise and settlement." Id. at 92-93, 110 A.2d at 36.
That such a rule would make plaintiffs less willing to compromise was not regarded as
a substantial problem. Absent collusion, a plaintiff makes a settlement on the basis of his
appraisal of the risks of recovery "and will hardly be deterred from it because it may
later eventuate that he accepted less than the settler's pro rata share." Id. at 93, 110
A.2d at 37.
The second alternative was suggested by Chief Justice Weintraub in Judson v. Peoples
Bank & Trust Co., 25 N.J. 17, 134 A.2d 761 (1957). Although Weintraub, writing for the
majority, continued to apply the formula from the first Judson case, he realized that it
was a less than satisfactory solution since there still remained some chilling effect on
settlements. In its stead, he recommended that a "good faith" settlement be regarded
as completely discharging the tortfeasor, but reducing the plaintiff's claim only by the
consideration actually received. Id. at 36, 134 A.2d at 771. Such a scheme, it was
reasoned, would encourage settlements while burdening the nonsettling party only
slightly. The difficulty with this recommendation, however, is that one joint tortfeasor
may still be subjected to bearing a greatly disproportionate share of the liability, despite
the presence of good faith. More important, the vagueness of a good faith standard is cer-
tain to generate considerable litigation. In addition, because intent is so difficult to prove,
such a criterion will probably breed collusion. See 12 RUTcRmS L. REv. 553, 536-37 (1958).
Wisconsin, which, like New York, has adopted a rule of relative fault among tort-
feasors (see Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962)), has also found the
pro rata alternative the most practical and equitable solution to the competing problems
of contribution rights and promotion of settlements. See Peiffer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 51 Wis.
2d 329, 187 N.W.2d 182 (1971); Pierringer v. Hoger, 21 Wis. 2d 182, 124 N.W.2d 106 (1963).
Similar to the court in the first Judson case, the Wisconsin court in Peiffer foresaw
that the pro rata rule would further "the goal of encouraging settlements of claims
against joint tort feasors." 51 Wis. 2d at 338, 187 N.W.2d at 186.
06 See McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659, 665 (D.C. Cir. 1943): "The problem is to
blend the themes of compromise and contribution, maintaining the essential integrity of
each as far as possible."
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release or covenant should constitute a full satisfaction of a tort-
feasor's fractional share of the liability. The plaintiff should retain a
cause of action against the nonsettling tortfeasors only for their pro-
portionate share of the liability as determined by the jury. This would
eliminate the need for impleader. The plaintiff, with the opportunity
to maximize the proportionate fault of defendants in his proof, would
thus perform the task previously undertaken by the impleaded re-
leasee.67
Although such a construction of New York General Obligations
Law section 15-108 does jeopardize a plaintiff's right to full recovery,
prompt settlement may help compensate for any monetary loss in-
curred. s Moreover, in view of the threat of large jury verdicts and the
pressure on insurers to accept settlement offers within policy limits,69
an injured party would still wield significant bargaining power. Finally,
such a resolution of the matter would extinguish the unfair and un-
necessary possibility of a gratuitous release by the plaintiff. Although
this practice may have the support of tradition, it has outlived its justi-
fication and conflicts with the modem emphasis on fairness. 70
CONCLUSION
Although New York General Obligations Law section 15-108
attempts to simplify the law of release and make settlement a more
equitable and attractive possibility, it has failed in its objectives. As it
is presently formulated, the provision can be rendered operationally
viable only by a restrictive and somewhat distorted construction of its
provisions. For this reason, the New York legislature should reconsider
the statute, and should endeavor to rewrite it along lines which comport
with the Dole decision and the compromise of public policy considera-
tions brought into focus by the emergence of this conflict.
Randy Jan Morell
67 Since both the releasee, if subjected to apportionment under Dole, and the releasor,
if subjected to the pro rata rule, are interested in maximizing the fault attributable to
the other tortfeasors, the absence of the releasee from the litigation should not adversely
affect plaintiff's ultimate recovery.
18 It has been suggested that certainty and speed of recovery in themselves are
valuable rights to plaintiffs and serve as inducements to settlement. See Havighurst, supra
note 5, at 17-20. See also note 63 supra.
69 See generally Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67
HAav. L. Rv. 1136 (1954); Note, Liabilities of an Insurance Carrier in Excess of Coverage,
3 Wi. & MA Y L. Ry. 357 (1962).
70 See Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.YS.2d 382 (1972);
note 58 and accompanying text supra.
